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The following is an excerpt from a DEF 14A SEC Filing, filed by HEWLETT PACKARD CO on 1/23/2007.
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HEWLETT PACKARD CO - DEF 14A - 20070123 - PROPOSAL_3


PROPOSAL NO. 3

STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL RELATING TO
STOCKHOLDER NOMINEES FOR ELECTION TO THE HP BOARD

        HP has received a stockholder proposal from the AFSCME Employee Pension Plan, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds and the North Carolina Equity Investment Fund Pooled Trust. These proponents have requested that HP include the following proposal and supporting statement in its proxy statement for the 2007 annual meeting of stockholders, and, if properly presented, this proposal will be voted on at the annual meeting. HP will provide the addresses of these proponents and the number of shares beneficially owned by each upon oral or written request of any stockholder. The stockholder proposal is quoted verbatim in italics below.

        Management of HP does not support the adoption of the resolution proposed below and asks stockholders to consider management's response, which follows the stockholder proposal.

         Our Board recommends a vote AGAINST Proposal No. 3.

Vote Required

        HP believes that approval of the stockholder proposal requires the affirmative vote of sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2 / 3 %) of the outstanding shares entitled to vote on the proposal at the annual meeting. Article IX of HP's Bylaws requires such a vote for any proposal by a stockholder to amend provisions of the Bylaws that relate to the nomination and election of directors. While the stockholder proposal seeks to add a new section to the Bylaws, it clearly relates to the nomination and election of directors and the 66 2 / 3 % standard should apply. Among other things, the stockholder proposal expressly requires compliance with some, but not all, provisions of Section 2.2 of HP's Bylaws, and, therefore, effectively amends Section 2.2.

STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL

         RESOLVED, pursuant to Article IX of the Bylaws (the "Bylaws") of Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP") and section 109(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, stockholders amend the Bylaws to add section 3.17:

    "HP shall include in its proxy materials for a meeting of stockholders at which directors are to be elected the name, together with the Disclosure and Statement (both as defined in this section 3.17), of any person nominated for election to the Board of Directors by a stockholder or group thereof that satisfies the requirements of this section 3.17 (the "Nominator"), and allow stockholders to vote with respect to such nominee on HP's proxy card. Each Nominator may nominate up to two candidates for election at a meeting.

    A Nominator must:

      (a)
      have beneficially owned 3% or more of HP's outstanding common stock ("Required Shares") continuously for at least two years;

      (b)
      provide written notice received by HP's Secretary within the time period specified in section 2.2(c) of these Bylaws containing (i) with respect to the nominee, (A) the information required by section 2.2(f) of these Bylaws and (B) such nominee's consent to being named in the proxy statement and to serving as a director if elected; and (ii) with respect to the Nominator, proof of ownership of the Required Shares; and

      (c)
      execute an undertaking that it agrees to (i) assume all liability stemming from any legal or regulatory violation arising out of the Nominator's communications with HP stockholders, including, without limitation, the Disclosure and Statement; (ii) to the extent it uses soliciting

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        material other than HP's proxy materials, comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including, without limitation, the SEC's Rule 14a-12.

      The Nominator may furnish a statement, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the nominee's candidacy (the "Statement"), at the time the Disclosure is submitted. The Board of Directors shall adopt a procedure for timely resolving disputes over whether notice of a nomination was timely given and whether the Disclosure and Statement comply with this section 3.17 and any applicable SEC rules."

SUPPORTING STATEMENT

         We believe that stockholders of U.S. public companies currently have no meaningful control over the process by which directors are nominated and elected. Stockholders whose suggested nominees are rejected by a nominating committee have no recourse other than sponsoring a dissident election campaign, which is so expensive that it rarely occurs outside the takeover context. Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk has estimated only about 80 contested elections occurred at U.S. public companies from 1996 through 2002 that did not seek to change control of the corporation.

         In our view, access to the proxy for purposes of electing a director nominated by stockholders with a significant stake in HP is the most effective mechanism for ensuring accountability. We believe that greater accountability would benefit HP and enhance shareholder value.

         We urge stockholders to vote for this proposal.

MANAGEMENT STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO STOCKHOLDER PROPOSAL

        The Board recommends a vote against this proposal that amends HP's Bylaws to require HP to include in its proxy materials (like this proxy statement) the names of up to two director candidates nominated by certain stockholders for election to HP's Board. The Board opposes this proposal because it provides for a mandatory amendment to HP's Bylaws without any input from HP's Board or management, and it would result in expensive, divisive director elections. Moreover, existing HP policies and procedures already provide for stockholder input in the director nomination and election process.

        Permitting certain stockholders to nominate director candidates in HP's proxy materials could lead to the election of "special interest directors" who represent the interests of the stockholders who nominated them, not the interests of all HP stockholders. It also could turn every director election into a proxy contest. This would be tremendously disruptive, require expenditure of significant HP resources and discourage directors from serving on the Board.

        Moreover, the proposal is not necessary because HP's stockholders have the opportunity for significant input in the director nomination and election process. As discussed on page 14 of this proxy statement, stockholders may submit recommendations for director candidates to the Nominating and Governance Committee. In addition, HP's Bylaws permit stockholders to nominate directors for consideration at an annual stockholder meeting and to solicit proxies in favor of such nominees. With respect to director elections, HP's Board has amended HP's Bylaws to implement a majority vote standard requiring that each director nominee receive more "for" than "against" votes to be elected. In addition, HP's Board has adopted a policy pursuant to which any incumbent director nominee who receives a greater number of votes "against" his or her election than votes "for" such election will tender his or her resignation for consideration by the Nominating and Governance Committee. Finally, unlike many companies, HP permits stockholders to cumulate votes in director elections, which gives stockholders an even more meaningful role in the director election process.

        For the reasons described above, the Board recommends a vote AGAINST this proposal.

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